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Due to the inability of the United States political structure to resolve deep internal dis-
agreements over the Vietnam War, Americans lost their faith in an effective public order 
regardless of their political sympathies. 1968 was the year in which faith in the nation’s po-
litical institutions cracked. The year began with an organized movement within the Democ-
ratic Party to oust Lyndon Johnson from the White House and to place an antiwar leader at 
the head of the party, a leader who would refocus the political energies of the nation on 
healing racial division and the “war on poverty.” The assassinations of Martin Luther King, 
Jr., and Robert F. Kennedy terminated movement to national reconciliation around a pro-
gressive program. Conservatives profited from escalating internal violence by presenting 
themselves as the only political force capable of bringing order. The New Left did not profit 
from the national political crisis, but new social movements forced into the public arena new 
conceptions of how the nation had developed and what “justice for all” entailed. The left 
failed politically, but its movements transformed the conduct of everyday life. The direction 
flowing from 1968 in the United States proved over the long term to be cultural regeneration 
of the nation’s liberal values to fit the realities of a more diverse and divided citizenry. 
 
Keywords: Conservatism. Liberalism. New social movements. Richard M. Nixon. Robert 
F. Kennedy. United States—cultural divisions. United States—distrust of public life. United 
States—1968 presidential election. Vietnam War. William F. Buckley, Jr. 
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“Romper lo que está resquebrajado”: 1968 en Estados Unidos 
 
RESUMEN 
Debido a la incapacidad de la estructura política de los Estados Unidos de resolver  los pro-
fundos desacuerdos internos sobre la Guerra de Vietnam, los americanos perdieron su fe en 
un orden público efectivo a pesar de sus simpatías políticas. 1968 fue el año en el que se 
quebró la fe en las instituciones políticas de la nación. El año comenzó con un movimiento 
organizado dentro del Partido Democrata que desbancó a Lyndon Johnson de la Casa Blanca 
y que colocó a un líder antibelicista a la cabeza del partido, un líder que centraría de nuevo 
las energías políticas de la nación en aliviar la división racial y la “guerra contra la pobreza”. 
Los asesinatos de Martin Luther King, Jr, y Robert F. Kennedy pusieron término al movi-
miento de la reconciliación nacional en torno a un programa progresista. Los Conservadores 
aprovecharon la escalada de la violencia interna presentándose a sí mismos como la única 
fuerza política capaz de traer el orden. La Nueva Izquierda no sacó provecho de la crisis 
política interna, pero nuevos movimientos sociales introdujeron en la escena pública nuevas 
concepciones sobre cómo la nación se había desarrollado y qué “justicia para todos” conlle-
vaba. La izquierda fracasó políticamente, pero sus movimientos transformaron la conducta 
del día a día. La dirección adoptada desde 1968 en Estados Unidos dio pruebas a largo plazo 
de ser una regeneración cultural de los valores liberales de la nación para adaptarse a las 
realidades de una ciudadanía más diversa y dividida.  
 
Palabras clave: Conservadurismo. Liberalismo. Nuevos movimientos sociales. Richard M. 
Nixon. Robert F. Kennedy. Estados Unidos—divisiones culturales. Estados Unidos— des-
confianza/recelo de la vida pública. Estados Unidos—1968 elección presidencial. Guerra de 
Vietnam. William F. Buckley, Jr.  
 
 
In 1978, 74 percent of those interviewed for a New York Times poll agreed that 
the “government was controlled by big business for its own profit,” a statement 
which only 18 percent had agreed with in 1958. Disenchantment with public solu-
tions to social problems had risen dramatically according to the poll and was a ma-
jor factor in the rapid decline in voter-participation rates that occurred during the 
1970s. Cynicism about the public order was higher among the Vietnam War and 
Watergate generation, those who reached voting age after 1965 than in the age co-
horts formed by the New Deal and World War II, but even these older Americans 
who had seen a powerful government-civil society alliance defeat fascism and lift 
the economic condition of the majority believed that the best days of the United 
States were in the past. A New York Times survey of nonvoters in 1979 found that 
58 percent of those who did not vote gave as their primary reason that the country 
needed “greater change than was possible to achieve at the ballot box,” while 41 
percent of those who voted agreed with that statement. Respondents who self-
identified as leftists had the most negative evaluation of political life in the United 
States, but conservatives, liberals, and moderates also questioned the nation’s ability 
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to solve its problems in the interest of the people. Distrust of public authority crossed 
every ideological, economic, and social alignment1. Americans had apparently lost 
their faith in an effective public order regardless of their political sympathies.  
The findings are one piece of evidence of how devastating the Vietnam War and 
the divisions it generated were for public life in the United States.2 1968 was the 
year in which faith in the nation’s political institutions cracked; it is not clear that 
the chasm separating citizens from their government has yet been bridged. The year 
began with an organized movement within the Democratic Party to oust Lyndon 
Johnson from the White House and to place an antiwar leader at the head of the 
party, a leader who would refocus the political energies of the nation on healing 
racial division and expanding Johnson’s underfunded “war on poverty.”3 The elec-
toral process brought positive results for the insurgency within the party as several 
localities voted by strong margins in favor of resolutions calling for withdrawal 
from Vietnam. In the first primary of 1968, held in mid-February, Eugene 
McCarthy, a senator from Minnesota largely unknown nationally running solely on 
an antiwar platform, garnered 42 percent of the vote, dramatically demonstrating 
how vulnerable Johnson was.4   
Robert F. Kennedy, former attorney general during the presidency of his brother 
John F. Kennedy and at the time a senator from New York, jumped into the race 
believing that he had a better chance of uniting the nation around a progressive po-
litical agenda. Even though the antiwar vote was split, Johnson suffered clear defeat 
in the next set of primaries. On March 31, Johnson announced he had ended his 
campaign for reelection in order to seek a negotiated settlement to the war.  Liberal 
electoral politics seemed to be successfully addressing the problem of the Vietnam 
War as it had the problem of civil and voting rights four years earlier.  Conflict and 
_____________ 
 
11 “Voters, Non Voters Alike Held Disaffected, Not Disillusioned,” New York Times 20 November 
1979, 1. 
2  On the Vietnam War and its impact on domestic politics in the United States see Walter LaFe-
ber, The Deadly Bet: LBJ, Vietnam, and the 1968 Election (Lanham, Md: Rowman and Littlefield, 
2005); Edward K. Spann, Democracy’s Children: The Young Rebels of the 1960s and the Power of 
Ideals (Wilmington, Del.: SR Books, 2003); Rhodri Jeffrey-Jones, Peace Now!: American Society and 
the Ending of the Vietnam War (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1999). 
3 On the organization of the anti-LBJ campaign within the Democratic Party, see William H. 
Chafe, Never Stop Running: Allard Lowenstein and the Struggle to Save American Liberalism (New 
York: Basic Books, 1993), 262-314; Bruce J. Schulman, Lyndon Johnson and American Liberalism: A 
Brief Biography with Documents (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). President Johnson engi-
neered the passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964 and the Voting Rights Act in 1965. These two bills, 
along with supporting legislation, ended all legal basis for racial discrimination within the United 
States. Johnson launched the “War on Poverty” in 1965. Budget constraints due to the cost of the 
Vietnam War forced Johnson to scale back anti-poverty programs in 1966 and 1967. 
4 On McCarthy’s campaign, see Dominic Sandbrook, Eugene McCarthy: The Rise and Fall of 
Postwar American Liberalism (New York: Knopf, 2004); George Rising, Clean for Gene: Eugene 
McCarthy’s 1968 Presidential Campaign (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1997). 
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dissension were a necessary part of problem-solving, for as a committee of faculty 
investigating the causes of student unrest at Columbia university put it, U.S. society 
was still in the process of shedding its authoritarian and paternalistic legacies. The 
antidote to protest was discussion:  
 
Bringing students closer into... the process of decision-making [will] promote that 
intimate exchange of ideas and experiences which is vital to maturity. It [will] 
also aid them in learning how to control rapidly changing technological, social, 
and cultural conditions ... When decisions are made largely on the basis of who 
has the most power, especially when power is concentrated in a formal authoritar-
ian structure, more and more people within the institution will be dissatisfied. 
When the decisions are made after full and frank discussion of the various issues 
involved, and with all opinions being taken into consideration, cohesion develops 
and effective teaching about the ways in which a democracy should operate is 
possible.5 
 
The faculty report, a brief for the virtues of modern liberal politics, was confi-
dent in the assumption that in the conflict between passion and rational decision 
making, reason prevailed if those in authority involved the public in discussion over 
national policies. Improper decisions were inevitable but could be corrected. With 
Johnson’s withdrawal, the U.S. political values and electoral appeared to be vindi-
cated, but only for the briefest of moments. 
Less than a week later, on April 4, a gunman killed Martin Luther King, Jr., the 
revered (and hated) leader of the civil rights movement who had turned into a par-
ticularly effective critic of Johnson’s war policies. In the aftermath of King’s death 
over one hundred cities suffered extensive riots and martial law; billions of dollars 
of property was destroyed, with dozens of blocks of central Chicago, Detroit, and 
many other cities burned down. The inherent violence historically underlying race 
relations in the country returned with a vengeance to swamp the moral luster of the 
civil rights struggle. 
Over the next two months, Robert Kennedy linked his campaign against John-
son’s war policy with the need to correct the historical injustice of the nation’s ra-
cial system. Two recent books, Thurston Clarke’s The Last Campaign: Robert F. 
Kennedy and 82 Days That Inspired America and Ray E. Boomhower’s Robert F. 
Kennedy and the 1968 Indiana Primary, have reexamined Kennedy’s race for the 
Democratic nomination to show that in the midst of national turmoil over the Viet-
nam War and a backlash to civil rights, an impassioned political leader campaigning 
from the left succeeded in assembling a diverse coalition that might well have taken 
the White House. Both authors foreground Kennedy’s demonstrated ability to excite 
_____________ 
 
5 Crisis at Columbia: Report of the Fact-Finding Commission Appointed to Investigate the Distur-
bances at Columbia University in April and May 1968 (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), 7. 
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loyalties across racial, educational, and economic divisions by playing to a widely 
shared faith in the nation’s problem-solving abilities. His electoral victory in Indi-
ana was particularly impressive given the state’s long history as a bastion of social 
conservatism and the nastiness of the campaign waged against him. His wins in 
Indiana and similar states seemed to justify Kennedy’s claim, “if we can reconcile 
Negroes and poor whites that they have common interests, and then add the kids, 
you can really turn this country around.” Indeed, Kennedy appealed to Latinos, Na-
tive Americans, and Asian Americans, and made it a priority prominently to high-
light the support he had in those communities. On June 6, the very last day of the 
primary campaign season, Robert F. Kennedy was assassinated after winning the 
California vote and securing his lead for the Democratic nomination for president.6   
Kennedy’s assassination ended any credible movement to national reconciliation 
around a progressive program. Hubert Humphrey, Johnson’s vice president, 
claimed the nomination, but lacked the support of the most impassioned wings of 
the party. The civil disturbances spreading across the city of Chicago during the 
Democratic Party convention and the visible dissension within party meeting, both 
major stories on nightly television newscasts, underscored how ineffective the party 
had become in managing either its own affairs or national dissension. Richard 
Nixon surged from the right, picking up support from working-class white voters 
angry with Johnson for his war and/or his civil rights record. Rick Pearlstein’s 
Nixonland: The Rise of a President and the Fracturing of America demonstrates 
how adroit Nixon was at exploiting the nation’s racial, regional, and class differ-
ences. Pearlstein emphasizes that Republican victories were tenuous rather than tri-
umphant. Nixon created a “silent majority” defined by fear rather than hope, and 
“silence” was indeed essential to his formula for successful governance.  Popular 
distaste for politics as such could shield the president’s administration from having 
to account for its actions. Nixon and his successors worked to augment already 
dangerous tensions dividing Americans in order to present themselves as the politi-
cal force best able to contain the chaos they themselves encouraged.7    
The strategy required a continuous drumbeat of crisis, the development of poli-
cies that increased feelings of insecurity within the population, and a discrediting of 
the very institutions conservatives controlled. As an example: “affirmative action,” 
that is preferential policies for hiring, admissions into schools, or the granting of 
government contracts to women and to members of racial groups that have histori-
cally been the victims of discrimination, has for forty years been a successful issue 
that conservatives use to denounce all government social policy programs. Ironi-
_____________ 
 
6 Thurston Clarke, The Last Campaign: Robert F. Kennedy and 82 Days That Inspired America 
(New York: Henry Holt, 2008); Ray E. Boomhower, Robert F. Kennedy and the 1968 Indiana Pri-
mary (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 2008). 
7 Rick Pearlstein, Nixonland: The Rise of a President and the Fracturing of America (New York: 
Scribner, 2008). 
Richard Cándida Smith      “Romper lo que está resquebrajado”: 1968 in the United States of America 
                                                                                     Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea 
                                                                                                                          2009, vol. 31, 135-148                      
140
cally, however, the primary architect of federal affirmative action policies was 
President Richard Nixon, who instituted the programs in 1969 despite the skepti-
cism of black civil rights leaders. Nixon may well have desired to improve the posi-
tion of African Americans in U.S. society, but he adopted policies that he knew 
would generate resentment among white males. Affirmative action served his elec-
toral purposes by subverting long-standing allegiances that unionized white work-
ing-class men had for the Democratic Party. With Machiavellian mastery, Nixon 
responded to white protests with proposals for scaling back his new policies, efforts 
that the Democratic-controlled Congress then felt it should block if a national 
commitment to racial justice were not to be rescinded. Instead of remedying the 
dramatically lower levels of education and property ownership that generations of 
segregation had caused in African American communities and working to equalize 
capabilities to compete for jobs and entrance into the best schools, affirmative ac-
tion functioned as a political football pitting communities against each other.8    
Given the tragedies of 1968 and the transparent cynicism of the politics that fol-
lowed, it should not be surprising that the perspectives most historians of the United 
States have brought to the year’s events have generally been negative. In The Unfin-
ished Journey: America Since World War II, one of the most widely used univer-
sity-level textbooks, William H. Chafe writes that the year ended with “defeat for 
those who sought a new society based on peace, equality, and social justice; victory 
for those who rallied in defense of the status quo. But in the process the nation 
faced, with brutal candor that had rarely been seen before, the stresses, tensions, and 
contradictions that lay at the heart of the modern-day experience.”9   
The outlines of this assessment had appeared as early as 1984, when Allen J. 
Matusow in The Unraveling of America: A History of Liberalism in the 1960s char-
acterized 1968 as the year in which the New Deal coalition that Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt had constructed spun apart.10 Matusow wrote at the beginning of Ronald 
Reagan’s administration. What had once been literally unimaginable, the ascen-
dancy of a laissez-faire, socially conservative Republican had become the actuality. 
Matusow explained the sudden lurch to the right as an inevitable result of the con-
tradictions that racial politics and an interventionist foreign policy posed for pro-
gressive liberalism in the United States. Matusow also blamed the student left and 
the black power movements of the 1960s for pursuing a politics of emotional con-
frontation and refusing to present rational argument. Protest expressed the rage that 
_____________ 
 
8 Vincent Hutchings and Nichollas Valentino, “The Centrality of Race in American Politics,” An-
nual Review of Political Science 7 (2004), 383-406; John Skrentny, The Ironies of Affirmative Action 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996). 
9 William H. Chafe, The Unfinished Journey: America Since World War II, Sixth Edition (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 330. 
10 Allen J. Matusow, The Unraveling of America: A History of Liberalism in the 1960s (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1984). 
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many felt, but radical groups had no strategy short of revolution. Nonetheless, in his 
estimation, their ability to seize the political stage was primarily the result of in-
fighting among mainstream liberals over where to lead the nation.   
Divisions within the Democratic Party over foreign policy remained, but after 
the 1968 election, the left wing of the Democratic Party linked with the reform wing 
of student movements to form a new alliance that could replace the New Deal coali-
tion. In 1970, Democrats in Congress began challenging Nixon’s war powers au-
thority, introducing bills requiring withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam. By 
1973, a bill mandating withdrawal passed with sufficient votes to override a presi-
dential veto. Nixon had already begun removing U.S. forces, but the new legislation 
prevented him from either slowing down or reversing the withdrawal underway. 
The same year, Congress also passed the War Powers Resolution that limited presi-
dential powers to commit U.S. forces in overseas conflicts without prior congres-
sional approval.11 The Watergate crisis and the increasing evidence of Nixon’s mis-
use of his power fed a liberal resurgence culminating with Nixon’s forced 
resignation in 1974 and even larger Democratic majorities in both houses of Con-
gress after that year’s midterm elections. In terms of national power, the new lib-
eral-progressive alliance proved unable to consolidate its power during either the 
Carter or Clinton administrations but maintained its strategic centrality within the 
Democratic Party as a whole and thus was the only effective national alternative to 
conservative dominance of the executive branch. 
Political void at the center and on the left provided an opportunity for the right to 
take leadership of a nation that in 1964 had repudiated the conservative program by 
an exceptionally large majority. Conservatives found in the events of 1968 confir-
mation for their assessment of the nation’s problems and a renewed chance to pre-
sent their case to the public. As conservative commentator William F. Buckley put 
it in his column of January 16, 1969, the left demonstrated it possessed only the 
power to make the “nation ungovernable.”12 Nixon won the election, though just 
barely, not because he was an attractive candidate, but solely because a conserva-
tive was better positioned on principle to act decisively to restore order. If candi-
dates on the right took firm, even inflexible stands on questions of law enforcement 
and preservation of traditional moral values, voters who otherwise disagreed with 
_____________ 
 
11 For debates over the constitutionality and impact of the War Powers Resolution see The U.S. 
Constitution and the Power to Go to War: Historical and Current Perspectives, eds. Gary M. Stern 
and Morton H. Halperin (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1994). Nixon and every subsequent 
president has claimed that the War Powers Resolution is an unconstitutional infringement of presiden-
tial responsibilities and authorities. Nonetheless, every president has avoided a confrontation over the 
issue with Congress and the courts, by generally adhering to the law even if often skirting its precise 
requirements. On the Case-Church Amendment that required withdrawal of U.S. military forces from 
Vietnam, see Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York: Penguin Books, 1997), 671-674. 
12 William F. Buckley, “The Psychology of Defeatism,” Los Angeles Times 16 January 1969, p. 
D6. 
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conservative priorities might temporarily shift their allegiances.  Buckley, at the 
time the most widely read conservative writer in the United States, was not optimis-
tic about the long-term prospects of a genuine reconstruction of the nation around 
respect for authority and tradition. The liberal ethos he thought was deeply in-
grained in political institutions as well as in the expectations of citizens. 
The circumstances surrounding the collapse of Lyndon Johnson’s presidency 
particularly disturbed Buckley. Like many others in the United States, he was elated 
when he first heard the news. There was national, even bipartisan agreement that 
the country needed a new president, but on further reflection, Buckley saw the 
manner of Johnson’s demise forcing future politicians to link complicated matters 
of war and security to electoral calculations. Many hailed Johnson’s defeat “as evi-
dence that the people are in better command of their own affairs. Others, conserva-
tives for the most part, will wonder whether it is all a cause for rejoicing.  The con-
servative fears plebiscitary government, for the very same reasons given by Burke 
and Adams. Instant guidance by the people of the government means instability, 
and instability is subversive of freedom... enthusiasm [in politics] subtly deterio-
rates into unreason, and such conscious rejection of standards and restraints as sus-
tained Mussolini and Perón.”13 
For conservatives, the crisis gripping U.S. politics had emerged because the na-
tion lacked a tradition of responsible authority, it lacked leaders who were invulner-
able to popular whim or willing to take decisive action even if unpopular.  A more 
extreme conservative commentator claimed that the country was under siege from 
“a Satan-inspired conspiracy of Man against God which has led to a world-wide 
defiance of His law and His plans for both societies and governments.”14 Buckley, a 
more careful but perhaps equally caustic critic of modern life, noted that the public 
in general was, despite its overt displeasure with protests, still inclined to sympa-
thize with and find excuses for demonstrators, particularly when they became the 
victims of police violence.15 Buckley argued that the American people were not to 
_____________ 
 
13 William F. Buckley, “The Unseating of Johnson: A Disturbing Phenomenon,” Los Angeles 
Times 8 April 1968, p. A5. 
14 Don Bell, “The Religion of Revolution: Before You Can Build, You Must Destroy,” Don Bell 
Reports, 7 June 1968. 
15 William F. Buckley, “How Plastic Must the Line Be Between Law and Its Defiers?, ” Los Ange-
les Times  6 September 1968, p. A5. A dramatic example of Buckley’s point that the citizenry was not 
supportive of violent suppression of demonstrators occurred in September 1970 during Ronald 
Reagan’s campaign to be reelected governor of California. Speaking at a campaign rally in a particu-
larly conservative community, Reagan got carried away with his denunciation of “student anarchy” 
and stated that if there needed to be a “bloodbath” to bring protest to a halt, “so be it.” As the news 
media reported Reagan’s comments, his comfortable lead in the polls vanished overnight. The cam-
paign issued rectifications assuring the public that Reagan intended to control campus unrest firmly 
but without violence. The lesson Reagan’s staff drew was that the people will support Republicans if 
they present themselves as good managers who maintain order and efficiency, but can easily lose sup-
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be trusted to support the firm steps a new leader would need to take to restore na-
tional greatness. The sovereignty of individual desire had overtaken ideas of law 
and moral code. Conservatives could win elections, but they worked in an adverse 
climate and the most successful conservative politicians adopted populist rhetoric 
that undermined their ability to provide voters with a genuine alternative to liberal 
politics. They would win by pledging to administer liberal programs more effec-
tively than liberals themselves could. Public opinion was largely against elimination 
of liberal social programs, and few politicians would have the fortitude to tell voters 
their preferences were wrong. Conservative leadership needed to be strategic in 
handling an unstable and untrustworthy public opinion that had long been divorced 
from the compass a strong moral tradition provided.16 
For radicals and revolutionaries within the United States, 1968 was equally a 
year in which lines of differentiation grew sharper, and unity became more difficult. 
All segments of the left criticized the Johnson administration and the putative Re-
publican candidate Richard Nixon. They had no agreement over whether to support 
the electoral campaigns of either McCarthy or Kennedy, and the largest student or-
ganizations were critical of shifting the focus from issues to candidates. For many 
leaders of the student left, elections were theater and the underlying reality of U.S. 
_____________ 
 
port if a candidate appears overly committed to public order. The episode in Reagan’s political career 
is discussed in detail in an oral history with Jack S. McDowell, Reagan’s press secretary at the time; 
see Jack S. McDowell, “Press Work and Political Campaigns, 1966-1970,” in Republican Campaigns 
and Party Issues, 1964-1976, (Governmental History Documentation Project: Ronald Reagan Guber-
natorial Era, interviews conducted by Sarah Sharp and Gabrielle Morris 1981 and 1983, Regional Oral 
History Office, University of California, Berkeley; online at http://www.archive.org/details/repcamp 
partyissues00sharrich), pp. 22-25. 
16 Buckley was a Catholic and sympathetic to the ideas of the Opus Dei order. In his time, Catholic 
Americans were overwhelmingly Democratic because the party had long protected the interests of 
cultural minorities.  Catholics were a minority within U.S. conservatism, though have seen become an 
essential part of the contemporary movement. The five most conservative members of the U.S. Su-
preme Court are all Catholics and shaped by neo-Thomist principles. On Buckley, see Linda Bridges, 
Strictly Right: William F. Buckley, Jr., and the American Conservative Movement (New York: Wiley, 
2007); David Burner, Column Right: Conservative Journalists in the Service of Nationalism (New 
York: New York University Press, 1988); John B. Judis, William F. Buckley, Jr.: Patron Saint of Con-
servatives (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988). On Catholic participation in and influence upon 
U.S. conservative movements see Thomas E. Woods, The Church Confronts Modernity: Catholic 
Intellectuals and the Progressive Era (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004); Peter R. 
D’Agostino, Rome in America: Transnational Catholic Theology (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2004); William M. Shea, The Lion and the Lamb: Evangelicals and Catholics in 
America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); John T. McGreevy, Catholicism and American 
Freedom: A History (New York: Norton, 2003); Gene Burns, The Frontiers of Catholicism: The Poli-
tics of Ideology in a Liberal World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992); Kevin E. Schmi-
esing, American Catholic Intellecutals and the Dilemma of Dual Identities, 1895-1955 (Lewiston, 
N.Y.: Mellen Press, 2002); Jay P. Dolan, In Search of an American Catholicism: A History of Religion 
and Culture in Tension (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).  
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society was violence. As protest grew stronger, so would the methods used by the 
government to maintain its control. Violence, therefore, was indeed a marker of 
success, and police brutality an experience necessary for young people to abandon 
their liberal illusions.17 The end result was not growth, but the self-destruction of 
organizations that had grown quickly during the 1960s and demonstrated their abil-
ity to capture the imaginations of students and the public.  Students for a Democ-
ratic Society (SDS) founded in 1960 to contribute to the civil rights movement 
while assisting community organizing and struggles for economic rights organized 
a national student strike against the Vietnam War for April 26, 1968, to test its 
strength. Over one million students stayed away from classes to participate in 
marches, sit-ins, and teach-ins. Yet within a year, the organization split apart as fac-
tions within SDS fought for leadership. Divisions grew over whether the “third 
world” or the “working class” was the vanguard of the coming revolution, and there 
were fights that turned increasingly violent over the relative importance of factory 
organizing or guerrilla warfare in the formation of a radical vanguard.18 
Between 1967 and 1970, a broad variety of new oppositional movements sud-
denly emerged to supplement the antiwar, labor, and black civil rights/power 
movements that previously dominated the left. Textbooks covering the period stress 
the radically new perspectives brought to political life in the United States by 
groups as varied as feminism; Asian American, Chicano and Puerto Rican activism; 
American Indian power and sovereignty movements; disability rights activism; pa-
tient rights activism; environmentalism; gay liberation, to list only some of the more 
prominent. The new movements taken together meant that the left no longer pre-
sented a unified understanding of U.S. political, economic, and social life, nor was a 
comprehensive theory of social change possible. Instead, advocates forced into the 
public arena varied, deeply personal concerns that had long been marginalized by 
liberals, conservatives, and socialists alike. Each new movement challenged con-
ventional ideas of how the nation had developed and what “justice for all” entailed. 
_____________ 
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Perhaps most importantly, movements forced norms for the conduct of everyday 
life to change, first in the intimate aspects of life such romance and family, but in 
law, politics, and economics, as new concerns generated new practices. Ideas of 
unquestioned national unity gave way to recognition of difference as fundamental to 
the human condition. A free society recognized and protected, rather than sup-
pressed, the variety of experiences constituting every social organization. Freedom 
was not an achieved state but a continuous act of moral exertion that rested on the 
willingness to state, “This is what I believe.” A new definition of pluralism took 
hold, and it was capacious enough that conservative groups like evangelical Chris-
tians could take their place in the mosaic of experiences, perspectives, and interests. 
No group could ever define a nation that was inherently pluralist and “multicul-
tural.” National identity emerged instead through the contention that normal politi-
cal life entailed. 
While conservatives could gain temporary advantage through stereotyping 
movements that were simultaneously social, cultural, and political, their leaders 
were aware how fragile their gains were. To the degree that “mainstream” voters 
knew feminists or gays personally, sympathy for the individual tended to overcome 
stereotypes about groups. General values were less important than what could be 
learned from person-to-person contact, precisely the point that conservatives like 
Buckley made in their analysis of why the United States was such an unstable soci-
ety. Further, the media was typically though not uniformly sympathetic to the new 
movements. Many of the most widely watched national television shows, such as 
The Mary Tyler Moore Show, All in the Family, Soap, or M*A*S*H, presented posi-
tive caricatures of the new cultural rebels while ridiculing conservatives whose 
commitment to tradition prevented them from learning from experience. Fortune 
magazine, a business journal produced by the Time-Life Corporation, produced a 
special issue on the new protest movements in 1969; in the introduction to the issue, 
the magazine’s editors claimed that precisely because protestors were willing to 
take a stand, they were “forerunners.” Their critical perspectives, rather than those 
of “conservatives” or “conformists,” would be the basis for the national commonplaces 
of the end of the century. Fortune’s editors predicted that because young social move-
ment leaders were unafraid of action and impelled by strong moral values, as they ma-
tured they find themselves in leadership positions in every part of U.S. society.   
Polls through the 1970s show remarkable consistency in the ability of large 
numbers of Americans to hold apparently contradictory opinions. Government was 
needed to maintain order, but politicians were by definition corrupt. Private action 
was more likely to solve important problems more effectively than the government. 
Ironically, the most frequently cited evidence for that conclusion was the success of 
protest movements for causes like civil rights, women’s equality, or the environ-
ment in getting the nation to confront its problems. Poll respondents censured the 
nation’s protest movements for excessive actions and statements, but large majori-
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ties still held that “most” protestors acted with good motivations, the issues they 
raised were important, and the end results were beneficial. 19   
The unifying thread connecting the protest movements emerging in the 1960s to 
the nation’s liberal traditions was the insistent demand that the principal decisions 
of one’s life be voluntary and not coerced. At the very minimum, individual auton-
omy mean the right to define the meaning of one’s own experiences, and that might 
include the decision that the satisfaction of desires hitherto decreed sinful was posi-
tive. The new movements insisted that private experience and public life were two 
distinct, antithetical orders, a stance that had profound ramifications for how one 
defined the scope of political life and the proper questions that should be included 
in its deliberations. The relocation of value from public order to private experience 
meant, for example, that “freedom” as the right to participate in civic life with the 
corresponding obligation to abide by its decisions yielded to a sense of independ-
ence from civic life and a diminution of its sacral character. Nonetheless, personal 
belief remained meaningless until it was expressed and received response. Freedom 
did not rest on the solitude of individual belief, but in a strengthened because un-
forced collective agreement that took into account a greater variety of experience. 
The growing divisions between public and private order also complicated long-
standing differences between right and left, for although conservatives insisted that 
government involvement in economic matters was socialism, they increasingly de-
manded that government rigorously enforce customary morality by reimposing bans 
on abortion lifted in 1973 (and possibly contraceptive technology as well), recrimi-
nalizing homosexuality, making divorce more difficult, and tightening censorship of 
the media and publications to eliminate morally offensive material. Conservatives 
most consistently maintained public visibility by clamoring for government control 
over the most intimate aspects of personal behavior.  Increasingly popular culture 
associated conservatives with repression of individuality. The right gained from the 
political vacuum of 1968, but by insisting that control of sexuality was the neces-
sary foundation for restoring national discipline lost the cultural wars.  
_____________ 
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Out of the cultural conflicts of the late 1960s three factors in particular became 
important political realities, factors that define the confusing shifts of late-
twentieth-century life in the United States:  
1) Greater frankness in public expression about varieties of individual behavior, 
particularly as related to sexuality;  
2) Distrust of public life as a persistent threat to the primacy of personal experience;  
3) Fracturing of a unified American identity based on shared myths of a common 
national history.   
The new history of the country emphasized that the crimes of genocide against 
Native Americans and of slavery lay at the founding of the American state. Despite 
protests by conservatives that this history was one-sided, its spread through school 
curriculum, through popular media, and its effects on public holidays was a specific 
instance of a broader distrust of all institutions that conservatives promoted for their 
immediate political interests but could not control. The new history facilitated mi-
nority groups finally able to speak of the oppression that had shaped their collective 
histories and their members’ individual development.   
Since 1968 and the election of Richard Nixon as president, the U.S. has been a 
society split between a conservative political hegemony and a culture where “any-
thing goes,” meaning open to vicarious exploration (and exploitation) of wider va-
rieties of behavior. Executive powers have grown, and presidents, regardless of 
party, have asserted their prerogative to act independently of Congress should he 
(and he alone) determined he needed to defend “national security” or “order.” The 
concentration of power has only intensified distrust of politics and the higher value 
the people of the United States place in personal relationships and private activity.  
The direction flowing from 1968 in the United States proved over the long term 
to be cultural regeneration of the nation’s liberal values to fit the realities of a more 
diverse and divided citizenry. The ability to speak of experiences that had always 
been painful but had only recently become expressible did not mean, however, ei-
ther that pain vanished or that its causes were known. Nor did it mean that rational 
discussion would follow, much less coherent problem solving. The narration of self 
and the valorization of difference have been no more than initial steps in a process 
with no predefined conclusion, but the new openness at the very least forced others 
in society to acknowledge the variety of experiences their world encompassed.  In-
stitutions in the U.S. now assume conflict rather than harmony as the practical basis 
of civic life. To use a metaphor that poet Robert Duncan proposed, social interac-
tion has become a debate between poems, in which each person tries with varying 
degrees of success to convey the meaning that he or she has found.20 Given the 
shifting interpretations and the fabulistic roots of consciousness that in its socially 
_____________ 
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determined forms seek expression in stereotypes, widening the scope of experience 
to which society will listen in no way guarantees an effective response.  Interper-
sonal dialogue, however valuable an element in establishing the needs of actual 
human beings as a foundation to group process, is not the same thing as social dia-
logue, in which the participants attempt to uncover the ways social structure, dis-
course, and identity are produced. The relation between private validity and public 
disorder remains the open, waiting-to-be-resolved problem of contemporary life in 
the United States. 
 
 
